Latin America in Disarray

In a recent visit to Mexico, last summer, I realized that the losers of the presidential election more than two years ago (which was discussed in the very first post of this Blog) do not yet recognize the incumbent president of the republic as a legitimate one. Meanwhile, kidnappings and assassinations by drug-traffickers rise up. The Mexican peso is falling down against foreign currencies. I found my colleagues and friends there more pessimistic than ever in the ten years since I went to Mexico for the first time.

In a lecture at the Autonomous National University of Mexico (UNAM), I tried to summarize remote and recent factors of Mexico’s and Latin America’s failed expectations. It was in a very interesting International Colloquium on ‘Modernity and anti-modernity in Mexico’ organized by the schools (‘facultades’) of Sciences and of Humanities. This is my summary, and the full paper link below.

FRUSTRATED POLITICAL ‘MODERNITY’ IN LATIN AMERICA

A few basic elements of political ‘modernity’ imply the building of a sovereign nation state with representative government. There are several factors that can explain the relatively low levels of political ‘modernity’ in most countries in Latin America, including Mexico. They can be identified as for:

1) Legacies of the Spanish colony, which was strongly ‘ancient regime’, in contrast to more ‘modern’ dominations by other colonial metropolis.

2) Independence outcomes, especially territorial fragmentation in dispersion and the subsequent ethnic heterogeneities.

3) Institutional choices, strongly oriented towards the concentration of presidential power.

For three hundred years, Spanish colonial rule had been arranging or creating ancient regime, medievalizing social and economic structures in which no effective administration or clear or enforceable civil or private property rights were established.

Most Spanish colonies in North, Central, and South America arrived at their independence probably too early –by the early 19th century. At that time, the independence leaders could not rely upon prior governmental resources nor their own organizational or institutional capacity to structure political alternatives, voters, and electoral competition. The new independent republics were very weak states, in the sense that they attained very small levels of tax collection and public expenditure, tiny administrative structures, little law enforcement, and ineffective armies.

In situations of low population density and weak administrative and technical capacities, the new independent rulers were unable to project their control over large territories and incorporate dispersed and ethnically varied groups into a single institutional framework. Many provinces and towns were in the hands of generals, colonels, and lieutenants who, fearful of the large group's corresponding domination and invested in their own local relations, struck out on their own and separated from their previous allegiances.

In contrast to the unifying federal process in the former British territory in the North (where 13 initial units formed a broad union, lately enlarged to up to 50), the initial four Spanish viceroyalties organized in North-Central America, the continental Caribbean, the Andean region, and the Southern Cone very quickly split into a high number of 20 states of disparate size and composition. Several of the new smaller states and closed societies proved to be rather inviable, not having achieved minimal degrees of institutionalization and social and political stability in the ensuing two hundred years.

Continuing into the 21st century, majority or large portions of the population in Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, and several states in Mexico cannot communicate beyond their small local communities because they only speak unwritten local tongues. In general, racial segregation, discrimination, exclusion, rebellion, and conflict have remained very long-term features across the continent.

In conditions of ancient regime social structures, precarious state resources, small size, lack of common language, and isolation, any minor social conflict, unrest or riot within a state tends to become a general political crisis, fostering reactions and counter-reactions questioning the basis of the community itself. Massive and steady emigration –mostly to the United States—has been a distinctive feature of most countries in the region.

The new independence political leaders in 19th century Latin America tried to substitute weak states with strong governments. Unfortunately, they tried to strengthen the government by concentrating powers in the hands of a single individual –the regime formula usually known as 'presidentialism'. It was over weak administrative apparatuses, backward economies, territorial fragmentation, and ethnic dispersion that new destabilizing political institutions were unable to channel conflicts and even contributed to the promotion of political unpredictability and social clashes. The typical Latin American presidentialist concentration of power creates very small, weak, and contentious governments, which also further weakens the state. Especially in societies with low levels of income, high economic inequalities and ethnical heterogeneity, presidentialist governments tend to be alienated from society, politically both trouble-making and vulnerable, and highly unstable.

See the full paper:

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COMMENTS

Leandro Prados said...

Dear Josep,

I have just received the latest post in your blog, which I read regularly. Congratulations for an excellent work!

I am attaching some extension of my previous work, which will be published in the Journal of Latin American Studies in 2009.

Greets,

Leandro Prados de la Escosura
Professor of Economic History
Universidad Carlos III

Lost Decades? Economic Performance in Post-Independence Latin America

Abstract

In this paper economic performance in post-independence Latin America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release of the colonial fiscal burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while opening up to the international economy represented a handmaiden of growth. Regional disparities increased since independence so easy generalizations cannot be established about the region’s long-run behaviour. On average, however, per capita income grew Latin America and though she fell behind to the U.S. and Western Europe, improved or kept its relative position to the rest of the world. ‘Lost decades’ appears as an unwarranted depiction of the period c.1820-c.1870.

International Political Science Association said...

Dear Dr. Colomer,

Your work is now on our website. See the Members books section at www.ipsa.org

Cordially,

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Membership & External Relations / Adhésions et des relations externes

International Political Science Association / Association internationale de science politique

Montréal (Québec), Canada.